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contributions. First, it describes the implementation of a solution, the Secure Active Network Environment 
(SANE), which is intended to operate on an active network router. The SANE architecture provides a 
secure bootstrap process, which includes cryptographic certificate exchange and results in execution of a 
module loader for introducing new code, as well as a packet execution environment. SANE thus permits a 
direct comparison of security implications of active packets (such as "capsules") with active extensions 
(used for "flows" of packets). The second contribution of the paper is a performance study using a 
combination of execution traces and end-to-end throughput measurements. The example code performs 
an "active ping" and allows us to break down costs into categories such as authentication. In our SANE 
implementation on 533 Mhz Alpha PCs, securing active packets effectively increases the time required to 
process a packet by a third. This result implies that the majority of packets must remain unauthenticated 
in high performance active networking solutions. We discuss some solutions which preserve security. 
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Lack of security is a major threat to "Active Networking," as programmability creates numerous 
opportunities for mischief. The point at which programmability is exposed, e.g., through the 
loading of code into network elements, must therefore be carefully crafted to ensure security. 
This paper makes two contributions. First, it describes the implementation of a solution, the 
Secure Active Network Environment (SANE), which is intended to operate on an active network 
router. The SANE architecture provides a secure bootstrap process, which includes cryptographic 
certificate exchange and results in execution of a module loader for introducing new code, as well as 
a packet execution environment. SANE thus permits a direct comparison of security implications 
of active packets (such as "capsules") with active extensions (used for "flows" of packets). 
The second contribution of the paper is a performance study using a combination of execution 
traces and end-to-end throughput measurements. The example code performs an "active ping" and 
allows us to break down costs into categories such as authentication. In our SANE implementation 
on 533 Mhz Alpha PCs, securing active packets effectively increases the time required to process a 
packet by a third. This result implies that the majority of packets must remain unauthenticated in 
high performance active networking solutions. We discuss some solutions which preserve security. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Programmable network infrastructures offer a variety of possibilities for changing 
the processes of protocol development, network service deployment, and interop- 
eration with host applications. Perhaps the most aggressive proposal for a pro- 
grammable infrastructure is "active networks," where "programs" are loaded into 
network elements on-the-fly, providing rapid dynamic reconfiguration of the net- 
work infrastructure, on a per-user or a per-packet basis. The design space for ac- 
tive networks has many dimensions, but the most important are flexibility, security, 
usability and performance. 
Flexibility and usability derive from the choice of programming language and 
programming environment. Among the available choices are Caml[Leroy 19951, 
Java[Arnold and Gosling 19961 and purpose-built programming languages such as 
PLAN[Hicks et al. 19981. The portability and distributed programming support of 
Java have made it a popular choice for active networking environments. 
The remaining important elements of the design space, performance and security, 
are both dependent on the language choice and have tradeoffs which are indepen- 
dent of the language choice. For example, a typesafe language such as Caml will 
preclude certain classes of errors from ever occurring (e.g., stray or intentionally 
malicious memory references), increasing the security of Caml programs[Leroy and 
Rouaix 19991. Authenticating packets of code will require a performance overhead 
independent of the properties of the language. 
Before we discuss the performance versus security tradeoffs further, we will 
present our security model. At a high level, information security consists of get- 
ting the right information to the right person at the right time. At an appropriate 
and greater level of detail, this statement becomes a statement of a security pol- 
icy, leaving any deviation from the policy defined as insecure. The very flexibility 
of an active networking infrastructure, since it expands the possibilities for mis- 
chief, expands the threat model posed to the network infrastructure. For example, 
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"denial-of-service" attacks are possible against a multiplicity of resources such as 
CPU cycles, storage and output link bandwidth, since these are used by loaded pro- 
grams. The essence of security is controlled access to resources, and in the active 
networking scheme, this means controlling the actions of loaded modules. 
Since the programming languages and their support environments largely deter- 
mine flexibility and usability, and significant performance increases will come from 
optimizing these environments (e.g., [Hartman et al. 1996]), providing security ex- 
pands the design space in a significant and necessary way. The goal of this paper 
is to outline the engineering tradeoffs between performance and security, and to 
point out the implications of these tradeoffs to architects of programmable network 
infrastructures. 
Our approach was follows. We first outlined the threats, old and new, faced 
by an active network infrastructure. These are discussed in Section 2. Using this 
outline, we designed and implemented an infrastructure which provides the basic 
elements required for security guarantees within and between network elements, 
namely: a secure bootstrap; key exchange; authentication and identification of net- 
work entities; packet confidentiality and integrity; resource and access control; and 
name-space protection. Section 3 discusses this infrastructure, called the Secure 
Active Network Environment, (SANE) and explains how SANE is realized in an 
active networking model such as Switchware. Section 4 provides a detailed mea- 
surement study of the implementation, with particular attention focused on a cost 
breakdown for an example application, "active ping." We also report on another 
experiment, the "active firewall." Section 5 discusses those results and the various 
costs in our system. Section 6 reviews our contributions and those of related work, 
and Section 7 concludes the paper with a discussion of the implications of these 
results for designers of active networks and other systems with mobile code. 
2. THREATS 
An active network infrastructure is very different from the current Internet. In the 
latter, the only resource consumed by a packet at a router is the memory needed to 
temporarily store it and the CPU cycles necessary to find the correct route. Even if 
IP [Postel 19811 option processing is needed, the CPU overhead is still quite small 
compared to the cost of executing an active packet. In such an environment, strict 
resource control in the intermediate routers was considered non-critical. Thus, 
security policies [Atkinson 1995~1 are enforced end-to-end. While this approach 
has worked well in the past, there are several problems. First, denial-of-service 
attacks are relatively easy to mount, due to this simple resource model. Attacks to 
the infrastructure itself are possible, and result in major network connectivity loss. 
Finally, it is very hard to provide enforceable quality of service guarantees [Braden 
et al. 19971. 
Active Networks, being more flexible, considerably expand the threat possibili- 
ties. The security threats faced by such elements are considerable. For example, 
when a packet containing code to execute arrives, the system typically must: 
-Identify the sending network element 
-Identify the sending user 
-Grant access to appropriate resources based on these identifications 
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-Allow execution based on the authorizations and security policy 
In networking terminology, the first three steps comprise a form of admission 
control, while the final step is a form of policing. Security violations occur when 
a policy is violated, e.g., reading a private packet, or exceeding some specified 
resource usage. In the present-day Internet, intermediate network elements (e.g., 
routers) very rarely have to perform any of these checks. This is a result of the 
best-effort resource allocation policies inherent in IP networking. 
In an environment where a considerable fraction (and perhaps eventually a nia- 
jority) of the traffic will be continuous media traffic, security must include resource 
management and protection with an eye to preserving timing properties. In partic- 
ular, a pernicious form of "attack" is the so-called "denial-of-service" attack. The 
basic principle applied in such an attack is that while wresting control of the ser- 
vice is desirable, the goal can be achieved if the opponent cannot use the service. 
This principle has been used in military communications strategies, e.g., the use of 
radio "jamming" to frustrate an opponent's communications, and most recently in 
denying service to Internet Service Provider servers using a TCP SYN flood attack 
[Panix 1996; Daemon9 et al. 19961. Another very effective (even crippling) attack 
on a computer system can occur due to scheduling algorithms which implicitly 
embed design assumptions. 
With an active network element, it is easy to imagine situations where user 
programs (or errant system programs) run amok, and make the network elements 
useless for basic tasks. The solution, we believe, is to constrain real resources 
associated with active network programs. For example, if we limited the principal 
(e.g., a "user") invoking the recursive shell script to 10% of the CPU time, or 10% of 
the system memory, the process would either limit its effects on the CPU to a 10% 
degradation, or fail to operate (since it could not invoke a new process) when it hit 
the table space limitation. Fortunately, a number of new operating systems [Montz 
et al. 1994; Leslie et al. 19961 have appeared which provide the services necessary 
to contain one or more executing threads within a single scheduling domain. 
3. OVERVIEW OF SANE 
The following subsections present the components of SANE and explain how they 
fit together. Figure 1 shows the various components of SANE and their depen- 
dencies. SANE provides security from the moment that power is applied to an 
active network node. This is done by using a secure bootstrap process that pro- 
vides integrity guarantees for nodes firmware and operating system components. 
Once the operating system and active network environment have been verified, the 
static integrity guarantees of the system have been assured and we transition to 
our dynamic integrity mechanisms. 
3.1 AEGIS 
All secure systems assume the integrity of the underlying firmware, but typically 
cannot identify when this assumption becomes invalid. This inability to detect 
changes in the integrity state of the hardware and firmware results in a significant 
security problem. The AEGIS Secure Bootstrap architecture reduces the severity 
of this problem by providing static integrity guarantees of the bootstrap process. 
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Fig. 1. SANE Architecture 
We define the static integrity property to mean that an object has not been altered 
while in storage or transit. 
AEGIS provides static integrity guarantees first by reducing the size of the 
firmware assumed as having the static integrity property down to the small sec- 
tion that tests the proper operation of memory and the motherboard. AEGIS then 
uses induction, digital signatures and modifications to the control transitions from 
major modules, e.g. CALL and JUMP instructions, to ensure the static integrity 
of the next module. We call the combination of these techniques Chaining Layered 
Integrity Checks (CLIC) . 
The goal of AEGIS is to prevent tampering of components that are considered 
trustworthy by the system administrator. AEGIS verifies the integrity of already 
trusted components. The nature of this trust is outside the scope of this paper. 
A more extensive review of AEGIS and a comparison with other secure-bootstrap 
efforts can be found in [Arbaugh et al. 1997; Arbaugh et al. 19981. 
3.2 Cryptographic Primitives 
SANE provides access to various cryptographic primitives. These can be used by 
other applications as-is or as building blocks for more complex protocols. These 
primitives are also used by SANE'S more advanced services. The primitives initially 
provided are: 
-symmetric key encryption (e.g., DES [NBS 19771) 
-(keyed) hashes (e.g., SHA-1 [NIST 19951) 
-public key signatures (e.g., DSA [NIST 19941) 
This set of primitives may be enriched in the future. All the algorithms have 
been implemented in Caml but due to performance degradation, we use a C ver- 
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sion of SHA-1. Access to this implementation of SHA-1 occurs through a Cam1 
interface, taking care to avoid potential bypassing of the type system. Support for 
cryptographic hardware in SANE is being considered. For more details on SHA-1 
performance, see Section 5. 
3.3 Public Key Infrastructure 
In our architecture, every network entity (active switch or user) owns at least 
one private / public key pair. These keys (and the corresponding certificates) are 
used to authenticate these entities and authorize their actions. Although SANE 
depends on a public key infrastructure, it is not tied to a particular one. Certain 
features, such as selective authorization delegation, user defined authorizations and 
certificate revocation through expiration are desirable, but they can be simulated 
in any of they proposed public key infrastructures. In our environment, we use an 
attribute-based certificate format similar to the original SPKI[Ellison et al. 19971 
proposal. For more details on the certificate format, see [Arbaugh et al. 19981. 
3.4 Key Establishment Protocol (KEP) 
A key element of SANE is the key establishment protocol. The protocol itself is a 
strengthened variation of the Station-testation [Diffie et al. 19921 protocol, which 
uses Diffie-Hellman [Diffie and Hellman 19761 key exchange and public key signa- 
ture authentication. The goal of the exchange is to establish a shared secret and 
authenticate the two protocol participants (node-tenode or user-tenode). Once 
the key is established, the authorizations of each party are determined, through 
the exchange of the appropriate certificates. Examples of such authorization is 
the amount of memory or CPU cycles a user is authorized to use on the active 
switch. The derived shared key is used to authenticate and / or encrypt further 
communications between the two parties. For more details on the protocol itself, 
see [Arbaugh et al. 19981. 
3.5 Packet Authentication and Encryption 
Once two nodes have established a shared key, they can commence exchanging au- 
thenticated and / or encrypted packets. In SANE, we use the ANEP [Alexander 
et al. 19971 packet format over UDP. We have added an authentication header, 
which is similar in form and purpose to the one used in the AH IP Security pro- 
tocol[Atkinson 1995al. The authentication header offers data integrity and replay 
protection services. A similar header has been defined for encrypted packet ex- 
change, again similar to the corresponding IPsec protocol[Atkinson 1995bl. 
It should be noted that the authentication offered by this service is end-to-end. 
It is fairly straightforward to extend the service to support digital signatures, and 
thus provide authentication of the initial packet origin. 
3.6 Link Keys 
When a SANE node boots, it attempts to establish shared keys with each of its 
neighbors. It does this by running the key establishment protocol already described. 
In the process, the identity of the neighbors is also verified. The administrator of 
an active network can essentially "freeze" the network topology by specifying which 
nodes can be neighbors. There are certain benefits in doing this: 
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-Certain distributed types of protocols (such as routing) can be secured against 
outside attacks 
-The switch offers secure forwarding services to any active packet that requests 
them. This is important for mobile agent types of applications that cannot 
depend on end-to-end security, but require some security guarantees on a hop- 
by-hop basis. 
-Administrative domains and their boundaries can be established through this 
process. We define an administrative domain as the set of active nodes that 
are managed by the same entity, have a common set of access and resource 
management policies and, after the KEP is run, trust each other (or at  least 
some subset of the nodes in the domain) to make some security decisions on each 
other's behalf. 
3.7 Administrative Domains 
A user who needs to load a number of modules on a set of active nodes would 
typically have to contact each node individually and establish security associations 
(SAs) with each one. This establishment could happen in either a telescopic man- 
ner (where the user "explores" the network) or a parallel manner (if the user knows 
the identities of all the switches in advance). This can prove expensive both com- 
putationally (because of the public key operations) and in packet size (since there 
must be a separate authentication payload for each node that a packet may visit). 
We define as an "administrative domain" a set of network nodes under the same 
administration, having the same security policy and some trust relationships with 
each other. Figure 2 shows a network consisting of a set of distinct administrative 
domains. Creation of an administrative domain involves providing the same security 
policy to all the nodes, and initiating pairwise authentication exchanges at boot 
time. By taking advantage of the existence of administrative domains, we could 
make some optimizations: 
Once the user has established an SA with some active node in another adminis- 
trative domain, that node can act as a key distribution server (KDC) similar to 
Kerberos [Miller et al. 19871. 
-Only nodes at the perimeter of an administrative cloud need verify the crypto- 
graphic integrity of packets. They can then specify what the active packet can 
do in the interior of the domain. In that respect, any machine at the edge of 
the domain can act as a firewall. In contrast to the Internet firewalls however, 
policy can be specified but not enforced at the edges; enforcement of access and 
resource management policies has to take place in the interior. 
We implemented the active firewall function in an experimental setup. For more 
details, see Section 4. 
3.8 Reso~~rce Control 
Resource control on the active switch is imposed by the runtime system, as specified 
by the certificates exchanged during key establishment. The protected resources 
include access to standard and loaded modules, use of CPU cycles, access to and 
allocation of memory, the ability to send and receive packets, latency and bandwidth 
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Domain C 
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Fig. 2. Administrative Clouds and Path Setup 
requirements, and others. It is a subject of further research exactly what the right 
resources are and how to resolve conflicting resource requests. 
In any case, since a tenet of our approach is controlled loading of modules, SANE 
must manage loading modules in a secure fashion if it is to be useful in an active 
network. That is, it must control which modules are loaded, and by whom. SANE 
associates cryptographic certificates with modules. SANE can either require a 
certificate for loading a particular module, or may allow universal loading of the 
module. Examples where such universal loading may be useful include low-cost 
operations like ping, as well as the security operations used for bootstrapping the 
security relationship with remote switches. There are two classes of certificate 
which can be presented by a user packet requesting access to a resource via a 
module. An administrative certificate allows loading of any or all modules into the 
system; it is intended for management and emergencies as might arise, and can be 
thought of as analogous to a "master key" granted by the switch administrator. 
More commonly, certificates are used to permit loading of selected modules. Once 
loaded, the certificates can then be used by the runtime system to allocate the 
specified amount of resources; for instance, the thread scheduler may terminate a 
thread that has executed longer than its certificate values allow. 
3.9 Naming 
Conceptually, loaded modules can be considered as the interfaces to user defined 
resources. Such resources will generally be shared between different sessions of the 
same principal, or even between different principals. These principals will need to 
identify (name) the particular resource they want to use. 
The SANE naming service allows for unsupervised but collision-free1 (secure) 
identification of programs. The basis of this approach is to combine hashes of the 
code, public keys (and signatures), and user-defined strings to generate "names" 
'TO the extent that the cryptographic hash functions employed are resistant to collisions. 
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for pieces of code. Thus, a certain program can have different names, each with 
different semantics and trust dependencies. Such a service is necessary in an active 
network environment where different users' modules can explicitly interact with, or 
even depend on, each other. For more details, see [Alexander et al. 19981. 
3.10 Overview of SwitchWare 
While the Secure Active Network Environment (SANE) architecture is portable 
across many active networking environments, our experimental prototype is con- 
structed in the context of the SwitchWare active network architecture. SwitchWare 
is based on the approach of using restricted semantics to contain the behavior of 
potentially mischievous programs. This has the benefit that enforcement of restric- 
tions can be performed once at compile or link time, resulting in a lower cost than 
an operating systems approach such as memory protection which requires repeated 
checks at runtime2. These semantic restrictions depend on the integrity of other 
system components such as the operating system, shared libraries, etc. The seman- 
tic restrictions are enforced with a strongly-typed language which supports garbage 
collection and module thinning. 
ALIEN [Alexander et al. 1997; Alexander 19981 is one of the systems built within 
the SwitchWare project. ALIEN provides the ability to built prototype active net- 
working systems based both active packets and active extensions. Active code is 
written the Caml language. ALIEN provides restricted access to the underlying sys- 
tem. For SANE, we have extended ALIEN to make use of the security infrastructure. 
4. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE OF SANE 
We have implemented SANE in the SwitchWare environment. For our experimental 
network we used a cluster of DEC Alpha 21164SX machines, with 533MHz proces- 
sors and 64MB memory each, connected via lOOMbit switched Ethernet. All the 
test machines were running RedHat Linux, kernel version 2.0.33, and a modified 
Caml 1.0.7 runtime system. For additional details of the configuration, see [Alexan- 
der 19981. 
To generate accurate timing measurements, we use the cycle counter available 
via the rpcc instruction. This is a 32 bit counter which increments once each clock 
cycle, thus giving a period slightly over 8 seconds. Back to back calls to rpcc will 
show a difference of two cycles. In C code, we call rpcc directly and attempt to print 
out results at times when the system is not being measured to minimize overhead. 
In Caml code, we use the locally written Time library. A start call immediately 
followed by a stop call averages between 1.5 and 2 psec (or about 500 times slower 
than rpcc). 
The activity of the garbage collector varied throughout the tests. Most of our 
tests were made without regard to the actions of the garbage collector, as we would 
expect to be the case if our system were being used in a production environment. 
However, in seeking the causes of some of the behaviors we observed, we did alter 
the behavior of the garbage collector to understand its contribution to the costs 
of the system. In the descriptions below of the tests that we ran, we mention any 
' ~ o d e r n  architectures have been optimized to handle memory protection reasonably fast. How- 
ever, some costs still remain. 
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special settings of the garbage collector. 
4.1 Cryptographic Primitives 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 show the costs of the three cryptographic primitives provided by 
SANE. Each was implemented twice based on two different sets of integer primi- 
tives. This is because the garbage collector requires a bit from each integer to use 
as a tag bit. Thus, we have made use of a package called Int32 which supplies 
full 32 bit integers on both Pentium and Alpha platforms (with additional space 
overhead); using this package allows a single implementation of our cryptographic 
routines which will run on either platform. (As the tables show, this portability can 
come at  a substantial cost in performance.) Finally, in addition to the bytecode in- 
terpreter which we use, the Caml distribution also provides a native code compiler 
which produces Alpha executables. Table 1 gives the average time in seconds to 
hash a 4MB string using either the Int32 package and using the 63 bit integers pro- 
vided by Caml on the Alpha. Additionally, it shows the difference in cost between 
compiled and interpreted code. Figure 3 shows the average time to hash different 
block sizes using the Caml (compiled to native code) and C implementations of 
SHA-1. Table 2 shows the cost to encrypt a 4MB message using 63 bit integers 
with either the bytecode or native Alpha code. Finally, table 3 shows the cost in 
milliseconds of signing and of verifying the message "abc," using DSA. Since a DSA 
signature consists of computing a SHA-1 digest followed by the signature process 
itself, for a longer message, one should add the cost of performing the hash. 
bytecode 86.446289 s 
Alpha ints bytecode 36.027246 s 
native 2.477051 s 
0.333212 s 
Table 1. Time to SHA-1 hash 4MB of data 
Caml Alpha ints bytecode 99.331543 s 
native 16.723242 s 
C 1.0785348 s 
Table 2. Time to DES encrypt 4MB of data 
In practice, to use the dynamic loader in Caml, we must use the bytecode inter- 
preter. Because the byte code version of SHA-1 has such a high cost and because 
that cost would be borne at least twice by every authenticated packet, we have 
resorted to a C implementation of the hash algorithm. While this greatly speeds 
the authenticator generation and verification operations, it may interfere with the 
Caml runtime thread scheduler. Specifically, when the end of a quantum occurs, 
if the current thread is executing C code, no call to the scheduler occurs and the 
thread will get an extra quantum. Furthermore, when using a C code implementa- 
tion, we cannot catch type-system errors internal to that code, nor take advantage 
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Table 3. Digital Signature Timings 
sign 
verify 
Block w e  (bytes) 
Fig. 3. SHA-1 Cost 
Cam1 
C 
Cam1 
of the garbage collection mechanism available in the runtime. For these reasons, we 
tried to limit the amount of non-Cam1 code in our system, so we opted to keep the 
Caml DSA and DES implementations. In the future, we intend to investigate the 
feasibility of statically integrating Cam1 native code into the bytecode interpreter 
in the same way that we currently are able to integrate C code. This would allow 
us to regain the advantages of strong types and garbage collection with a more 
acceptable overhead, as can be seen in Figure 3. We also believe that in the future, 
"Just In Time" compilation techniques can narrow this gap in performance. 
The key exchange protocol was also implemented in Caml as a three step proto- 
col. In the- first two messages, a list of SPKI-like certificates encoded as a string is 
exchanged. The third message contains a single certificate. Since the SPKI[Ellison 
et al. 19971 format has not been fully specified, we designed our own certificate 
format in the same spirit. The protocol was designed to be fail safe [Gong and 
Syverson 19951 under all circumstances. In the presence of loosely synchronized 
clocks, it becomes fail stop (meaning that active attacks, including replays, on the 
protocol, are always detected). We encode all fields in the certificates as strings 
before transmission, and for signing and verification purposes. This allows us to 
Int32 bytecode 27.089 ms 
native 12.954 ms 
Alpha ints bytecode 20.907 ms 
native 11.855 ms 
2.800 ms 
Int32 bytecode 41.452 ms 
native 22.121 ms  
Alpha ints bytecode 35.198 ms 
native 20.664 ms 
C 5.000 ms 
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avoid complicated marshalling issues. The average execution time of KEP with a 
256 bit Diffie-Hellman exponent is 2.4 seconds, and with a 1024 bit exponent, 4.8 
seconds. In both cases we used a 1024 bit modulus. This time is comparable to 
that of the IPsec key management protocols, Photuris [Karn and Simpson ] and 
IKE [Maughan et al. 19961. 
The certificate infrastructure we used in our setup is a shallow hierarchy. A small 
number of keys are considered as trusted to make statements about nodes or, more 
specifically, what the network topology is. These same keys are also used to certify 
users and specify their access rights on the active nodes. It is only a matter of policy 
however what sort of certificate method is followed. A cyclic graph-type (such as in 
PGP[Zimmerman 19951) or a hierarchical approach (such as in X.509 [Committee 
19891) or any other method can be used. Furthermore, there is no need for an 
organization's internal certification policies to be the same as the interdomain and 
interorganizational policies. 
4.2 Cost of Active Ping 
To understand the cost imposed by authentication, we measured the cost of sending 
an active ping (provided as Appendix A for illustration). This ping was generated 
at a source machine, transmitted over a crossover cable via 100 Mbps Ethernet to 
the target machine, loaded and evaluated, then sent back to the source machine, 
where it was again loaded and evaluated. 
The compiled byte code file, saneping.crno, is 2230 bytes long. (When we are 
timing saneping.ml, it is slightly longer as the code to call the timing routines 
is added.) This results from about 60 lines of code. Transmission requires two 
Ethernet frames; fragmentation and reassembly is taken care of by UDP which we 
use as a "link layer" in this experiment. The results are described in Section 5. 
4.3 Bandwidth Testing 
We have also built an experiment to test the bandwidth available with active pack- 
ets. This experiment sends 101 packets from the originator to the receiver. On the 
receiver, we check to see if all packets were received. If not, we add delays between 
the transmission of each packet until we do receive each packet. We then examine 
the time from when we started sending data until the kernel had accepted all the 
data on the sender and the time from when the first packet arrived until the time 
the last packet arrived on the receiver. (For all packet sizes greater than 32 bytes, 
we had to use a delay of 1-2psec. This results in an error in measuring the receiving 
side because we include one extra delay after the last packet in the measurement.) 
Figure 4 shows the bandwidth in megabits per second. 
4.4 Implementing an Active Firewall on SANE 
While the task for legacy firewalls is to locally decide on whether to forward or drop 
packets traveling between an external, untrusted network and an internal, trusted 
network, we define the operation model of an active firewall as follows: an active 
firewall is an active node that is connected to multiple domains of different security 
policies and has to map the set of credentials being carried across domains to match 
policy and security principals in each domain. 
In a simplified yet complete realization, our active firewall has to control (i.e., 
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Fig. 4. Bandwidth of authenticated active packets 
restrict or explicitly allow) packet code attempting to execute in the secured part 
of the network. The secure nodes trust the firewall, which is expected to provide 
"guidelines" to the nodes with regards to access policy. Our active firewall then 
operates by attaching attribute certificates to active packet attempting to enter the 
trusted network. These certificates define the suggested access and resource usage 
policy for the internal node. Such policies can be: 
-DATA-ONLY: the packet can only call data delivery primitives 
-ALL: giving full access to the execution environment 
-a string representing the primitives, modules and globals (including functions) 
the active code is allowed to use. 
The certificate is signed by the firewall, and encoded into the ANEP packet 
header. Having been signed by the firewall, it is trusted by the internal nodes. While 
our current implementation supports per-packet authorization only, it is possible 
to provide more persistent authorization per module or sender (packet header) 
information. Furthermore, establishing a security association by sending a shared 
secret from the firewall to the internal node and using additional authenticators for 
that association in the header would be more desirable if associations have a longer 
life-cycle. Arriving at  the final destination, the packet's encoded certificates are 
verified and the authorization string is extracted and passed along with the packet 
code to the Cam1 dynamic linker. We enhanced the linker to perform access checks 
on the incoming code relocation list, before proceeding with the actual linking. 
Since the relocation list is essentially the contact surface between the incoming 
code and the node execution environment, we believe that this approach offers 
efficient control and high security. 
In our experimental topology, kenny is an active firewall between the unsecure 
network with two nodes (mrhat, mrgarrison) and the secure network with one node 
(chef). Both external nodes send active pings which, to be evaluated by chef, need 
access to modules "Safeloader" and "Saneproto." The firewall, according to its 
local policy , issues a certificate for packets coming from mrhat only, still forwards 
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packets from both unsecure nodes to chef, which executes for the authorized packet 
and raises an exception and logs the event for the packet coming from mrgarrison. 
In our case, any certificate issued by a principal other than the firewall would 
be invalid. The above experiment shows SANE'S flexibility in providing security 
services. It is important to note that, policy can be either suggested or enforced, 
so that secure nodes may wish to maintain their own security policy and trust 
relationships, possibly overriding firewall decisions, a clear advantage over legacy 
firewalls in certain scenarios. 
5. RESULTS 
We have inserted timing points into ALIEN and into saneping to find out where the 
costs in the system are. We then classify these costs into several divisions. Based on 
these divisions, we can make an assessment of how these costs can be ameliorated. 
Fig. 6.  Times for saneping 
Figure 6 shows the timings for a set of 1000 pings. Both the slowly rising nature 
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of the data and the line of outliers are described below. The next several sections 
describe how the tests were conducted and the results that we observed. 
5.1 Breakdown of Costs 
To better understand the behavior of our system, we used our timing infrastructure 
to time sections of the code. For each test, we arranged to time a single section of 
the code. We then started ten pings with sufficient delays between them to ensure 
that no two pings were being processed simultaneously. 
Times reported are medians unless we specify otherwise. As Jain [Jain 19911 
describes, for a skewed distribution, the median is the best indicator of central 
tendency. Generally speaking, we tend to see data which clusters with very few 
points below the cluster, but with outliers above the cluster. These outliers occur 
because of events like resizing of tables or garbage collection. We also report the 
Semi-Interquartile Range (SIQR) or scaled SIQR when warranted. Recall that the 
quartiles Q1 and Q3 are the points such that 25% is less than or equal Q1 and 
75% of the data is less than or equal to Q3. The SIQR is (Q3 - Q1)/2; it gives 
some notion of how dispersed the data are. The scaled SIQR is the SIQR divided 
by the median and can be expressed as a percentage. A low value indicates tight 
clustering of the quartiles around the median; conversely, a high value indicates 
dispersed data. 
Figure 73 shows the breakdown of these costs into categories. We have divided 
the code executed to process saneping into six categories. We then categorized the 
timing results based on which of these categories best described the activity being 
timed. Note that because of the additive nature of the errors introduced by our test 
infrastructure, smaller elements of the graph may be overrepresented. Nonetheless, 
the ordering of the elements should be correct. 
The largest of these categories is "kernel/wire" which is the time spent in the 
kernel and in transmission between the two systems. We measured a median time 
of 3078psec (with scaled SIQR 1.65%) for this value. We believe that some of 
this cost could be reduced either by running the Cam1 runtime in kernel mode 
or by using the techniques proposed by Brustoloni and Steenkiste [Brustoloni and 
Steenkiste 19961. Additionally, we believe that it would be possible to create a 
compiler which optimized for byte code size, which would also reduce this cost 
somewhat. A motivated programmer could also optimize the byte codes by hand 
(but this seems contrary to the advances that compilers have made since the 1970s). 
This is probably the area over which the programmer has the least control. 
The next largest overhead is due to authentication. Therefore, each time a packet 
is sent and received, the SHA-1 hash is computed, which accounts for practically 
all of the authentication cost. In fact, of the total cost of our active ping, 33% is 
spent on authentication. As long as this is the case, authentication needs to a rare 
operation in high performance applications. Two primary approaches to avoiding 
too frequent authentications are caching as in the ANTS architecture or designing a 
domain specific language as in the PLAN architecture. Caching has the advantage 
that, to the extent that active code is reused by a flow, the cost of authentication 
(and several of the other costs we discuss here) can be amortized. A domain specific 
3Values rounded and do not total 100%. 
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language such as PLAN avoids the need for authentication and thus can be used 
by applications that have very dynamic needs that result in constantly changing 
active code. 
Another approach to reducing the cost of authentication and transmission is a 
reduction in the size of the transmitted active code. As seen in Figure 3, the cost of 
authentication increases linearly with the size of the data to be authenticated / ver- 
ified. (For keyed-hash or MAC4 type of authentication, the process of "signing" and 
verifying is the same). Thus, if we can reduce the size of the transmitted packets, we 
can reduce the cost of authentication. This can be achieved by data compression or 
(in the case of active code) by a compact bytecode, such as Spanner[Schwartz et al. 
19981. Other ways of speeding up the authentication include hardware assistance, 
cryptographic ceprocessors (possibly on the network card, or even entirely outside 
the system), and faster software-authentication algorithms[Halevi and Krawczyk 
19971. 
In Figure 8, we have removed the kernel / wire and authentication elements to 
focus on the costs imposed by ALIEN. We examine each of these in turn. 
4~essage  Authentication Code 
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5.1.1 Cam1 overhead. The largest of the costs from ALIEN is the category which 
we have called Caml overhead. This consists of the cost to link a byte code file 
into the running system. When using active packets, this cost occurs on every node 
visited and so is particularly important. We have not evaluated less easily measured 
costs such as the overhead of using byte code and this interpreter or the relative 
efficiency of the Caml libraries for the task at hand. Overall, we measured the cost 
of loading a byte code file (on each of the two machines along the path) to have a 
median time of 1148psec with a scaled SIQR of 2.29%. 
We also ran tests to more tightly characterize some effects of the runtime system. 
These tests were run with an enlarged minor heap and invocations of the major 
garbage collector at times which minimize garbage collection activity during the 
timing period. 
In particular, as described in [Alexander 19981, we divided the code used to load 
a byte code file into sections and timed these sections. We found several undesirable 
characteristics. One of the most significant features of Figure 6 is that the ping 
time rises in later tests. This is caused by the growth of the symbol table, which is 
stored as a hash table. Each new active packet declares the same set of symbols, 
which shadow the previous definitions. This causes a problem because, whenever a 
new entry is inserted into the hash table, the insertion routine counts the number 
of elements in the bucket by traversing a linked list. This is done to determine 
18 Alexander, Anagnostakis, Arbaugh, Keromytis, and Smith 
whether it is time to resize the hash table. The occasions when the hash table is 
resized cause the lower line of outliers in Figure 6. Additionally, if a symbol from 
a library should hash to the same bucket as one of the symbols from ping, it will 
be at the "bottom" of the bucket. 
The upper set of outliers is caused by a similar problem. There is an array which 
contains global information used by the linker, to which each ping adds new entries. 
(In fact, the entries shadow the entries from the previous ping in our case. Because 
this is not typical behavior for a program, the runtime system makes no attempt 
to find this sort of shadowing.) Every 12 to 13 pings, the array fills and must be 
resized. Moreover, the data in the old array must be copied to the new array which 
accounts for the steep slope of the line through this set of outliers. 
This example illustrates one of the weaknesses of our approach in ALIEN: by 
choosing an existing language, we gain a large infrastructure, but elements of that 
infrastructure are designed for a different problem than ours. In several cases, the 
implementors of Caml have assumptions that are different from ours. We have 
identified two categories of differing assumptions: assumptions about amortization 
and assumptions about time scales. Garbage collection of the minor heap illustrates 
both of these points. While copying garbage collection can take less time than com- 
parable dynamic memory management using an explicit system like malloc [Appel 
19871, this is often accomplished by "freeing" many allocations simultaneously. For 
a long running, computationally bound program, it is reasonable to assume that 
the user is only concerned with time to completion and so this sort of amortization 
is appropriate. Even with an interactive program, if the length of the pauses can 
be made short enough so that the user does not perceive them, this approach works 
well. The key here is that with a single user, amortization reduces the costs paid 
by the user. In contrast, in ALIEN with multiple users, amortization may mean 
that some switchlets see an increased cost as they pay not only for freeing their 
own allocations, but also those of other switchlets. Moreover, because switchlets 
may be sensitive on much finer time scales than a human can perceive, the level of 
acceptable jitter in ALIEN is lower than would generally be the case. 
In the case of garbage collection, incremental collection techniques based on 
Baker's algorithm [Baker 19781 or the techniques from [Nettles and O'Toole 19931 
and [O'Toole and Nettles 19941 can be helpful. The major heap is collected us- 
ing such a incremental technique. Another approach to the problem described in 
[Shaw 19981 uses a separate minor heap for each thread thus solving the amortiza- 
tion problem (as well as allowing access to multiple processors). Nonetheless, any 
language to be used for Active Networks must be examined closely for instances 
of these assumptions. This is particularly true for languages designed for general 
purpose use where such assumptions are generally reasonable. 
More generally, if the same program is to process different data repeatedly, if 
we adopted a means of caching and reusing active packets such as the facilities 
provided by ANTS [Wetherall et al. 19981, this would also solve both of these 
problems. Additionally, it would reduce our kernellwire costs, our authentication 
costs, our Caml overhead, and some of our marshaling costs. Since these are our 
four most expensive activities, such an approach seems warranted. Moreover, it 
would reduce some of our unmeasured costs. For example, with more reuse, we 
should reduce the amount of memory allocation and hence the frequency of our 
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module An-marshal = struct 
type packet-data = { code : string; data : str ing;  func : str ing 
l e t  encode pkt = Marshal.to-string pkt [I 
l e t  decode s t r  off  = Marshal.from-string s t r  off  
end 
Fig. 9. Signature for A n ~ a r s h a l  
garbage collections. If dynamic code generators or just-in-time compilers cause the 
automatic generation of active packets to become common, however, the costs that 
we have outlined will be important. 
5.1.2 Marshaling. The next largest set of costs are due to marshaling data. The 
difficulty comes in making sure that the switchlet can only do this in a secure 
manner while at the same time striving to deliver adequate performance. 
For example, Cam1 provides a module called Marshal which allows complex data 
objects to be transformed into strings and back again. However, these functions 
do not perform checking to ensure that data objects created this way are valid 
on this machine. Thus, they provide a means to subvert the type system which 
undermines our security. More concretely, thread IDS are internally a pointer to 
a (C) struct containing information about that thread. If an attacker were able 
to guess the address of the descriptor for a thread that he wanted to attack then 
it becomes simple to create a string which has the bit pattern which corresponds 
to that address. A call to Marshal. f romstring would transform this into a valid 
Thread.t. Since opaque types are intended to be unforgeable, we use them as 
capabilities; the attacker could now kill the thread described by the forged ID. For 
this reason, we do not make the Marshal module available to switchlets except in 
limited circumstances. 
Figure 9 shows Anlnarshal which is a module we provide which allows transfor- 
mations between structures containing three strings and a string which can be sent 
over the network. Because the only data objects which can be created are strings, 
we avoid any security holes. 
In cases where we need to marshal other data, we use ad hoe methods usually 
based on Printf . sprintf. For example, when SANE sends a certificate, the SHA- 
1 values which describe the programs which are authorized are first converted from 
a binary value to ASCII strings. Similarly, to send the starting time for saneping, 
we use sprintf with a %f conversion to create an ASCII string that we can send 
over the network. When the ping returns to the originator, we use a combination of 
regular expression routines and string to float conversions to recapture the original 
value so that we can find the latency. 
Unfortunately, this has a significant performance penalty. Anlnarshal . decode 
has a median cost of 77psec; pingdecode has a median cost of 162psec. Similarly, 
Anlnarshal.encode has a median time of 72psec as compared with 189psec for 
ping-encode. 
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5.1.3 Infomation Gathering. This category consists of the time spent by the 
active packet gathering information about its environment. Thus, asking the R o u t e  
module for the next hop on the route to the destination or finding the address of 
the current host falls into this category. We have also included the cost of reading 
from disk the bytecode file for the program portion of tlie active packet. Overall, 
these operations have a median cost of 1094psec. 
The cost of reading-in the bytecode file, however, is driven by whether it is in 
the buffer cache of the host. (Linux maintains an in-memory cache of recently used 
file blocks. Our test file is small enough and our test machine has enough memory 
that we believe the first read of the file caused the kernel to go to the disk to get 
the file whereas for subsequent reads of the file, the kernel was able to find the 
file in memory.) A typical cost for reading the byte code file for the first ping was 
39,280,usec. The median cost was 1043psec. Further, if we calculate tendencies for 
this cost for the pings after the first, we find a median of 1040,usec and a mean of 
1031psec. The scaled SIQR is 2.55% and the standard deviation is 39psec. 
5.1.4 Transmission Related Costs. The final section is transmission-related costs. 
This is the cost of calling Udp. sendto-udp and queuing a packet for processing on 
the receiving side. Some of the time from the former is also measured in the 
kernel/wire category. 
While this is the section with the lowest cost, there is a potential source of 
improvement. We use queues to pass packets up to the thread that has registered 
an interest in these packets. It has been suggested that if we instead allow the 
thread to register an upcall, we save the cost of queuing and dequeuing the packet 
and possibly of a context switch. Our concern is that doing so allows a malicious or 
buggy thread to "capture" the thread that is intended to retrieve packets from the 
interface. Finding a scheme that allows recovery in the case of such a misbehaving 
thread, but which normally has only the cost of the upcall approach is an interesting 
area for continued study. 
6. RELATED WORK 
The Secure Active Network Environment has no direct analogues in ongoing work 
on active networks [Tennenhouse et al. 19971. While ANTS uses MD5 hashes ("fin- 
gerprints") to name on-demand loaded modules, the hashes provide unique names 
rather than security. The ANTS execution environment depends on the Java pro- 
gramming language for protection, a dependency shared by many active network 
prototypes. Unfortunately, as [Wallach et al. 19971 notes, Java's security is suspect. 
The remote authentication and namespace security of SANE address issues ignored 
in these systems, and could be applied even in cases where Java is used, e.g., to 
provide integrity checking of the JVM or layers beneath it, as well as on-demand 
loaded modules. 
Another quite different approach to providing secure active networking is that 
used by the Programming Language for Active Nets (PLAN). PLAN is a special- 
purpose programming language appropriate for per-packet programs. PLAN'S se- 
mantics are purposely restricted to operations which are safe and bounded in re- 
source usage, with the intention of being so lightweight that any node would be 
willing to run PLAN packets, including those from remote nodes, and thus would 
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not require the security of SANE. However, as any enhanced services are added to 
the node as PLAN services, such services would require a SANE-like approach for 
security. 
An architecture which extended a protection model from the local domain to a 
distributed environment was provided by Sansom, et al. [Sansom et al. 19861, who 
enforced protection locally with memory-protection enforced capabilities. (It is no- 
table that capabilities can be viewed as a namespace-based protection mechanism). 
The capabilities were extended to remote nodes via cryptographic means. SANE 
provides more general mechanisms and could thus be specialized to such an applica- 
tion (moving memory-protected objects about the network) but more importantly 
guarantees local integrity before extending itself into the network. 
Of interest is the Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [Necula 19971 approach, which 
permits arbitrary code to be executed as long as a valid proof of safety accompanies 
it. A number of important questions remain to be answered (e.g., cost of proof 
verification, ability to handle abstract resource types in a dynamic environment) 
before we can determine exactly how and to what extend it can be used. 
The Safetynet Project [Wakeman et al. 19981 at the University of Sussex has also 
designed a new language for active networking. They have explicitly enumerated 
what they feel are the important requirements for an active networking language 
and then set about designing a language to meet those requirements. In particular, 
they differ from PLAN in that they hope to use the type system to allow safe 
accumulation of state. They appear to be trying to avoid having any service layer 
at all. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has made two contributions. First, it has presented the design and 
implementation of a secure active networking system, SANE, which provides a 
tight coupling between programming language means of protecting resources and 
cryptographic means to extend the enforcement of the protection semantics across a 
network. SANE'S realization in Switchware allowed us to exploit the ALIEN active 
loader and its packet execution environment to provide a direct comparison of active 
packets against active extensions which operate over a multiplicity of packets. 
Second, a detailed measurement study was performed using this infrastructure. 
The costs of various cryptographic operations were studied independently, and then 
the entire SANE system was instrumented and measured using applications such 
as an "Active Ping." Using PCs with extremely high performance arithmetic (533 
Mhz Alphas) and native mode cryptographic implementations to make these op- 
erations as fast as possible, we discovered that the basic operations required for 
authenticating packets require a 33% overhead relative to unauthenticated pack- 
ets. In an environment where an increasing amount of traffic is multimedia-related, 
such overhead may be unacceptable for data transmission. However, there are a 
number of promising avenues of attacking this problem (hardware assistance, faster 
software algorithms[Halevi and Krawczyk 19971). 
Of more interest is the effect of the overhead to the control-plane scenario of 
Active Networks5. For a secure system, we see two architectural paths to high 
5 ~ y  control-plane scenario we mean using Active Network functionality to control, but not actually 
22 Alexander, Anagnostakis, Arbaugh, Keromytis, and Smith 
performance. First is the use of active extensions, as they pay the cost of au- 
thentication once for a stream or packets, achieving the benefits of amortizing the 
security costs over a large number of packets. We note in passing that the caching 
scheme employed in the ANTS architecture is effectively a "soft-state" active ex- 
tension, and thus enjoys this benefit for its MD5 hashes. The second approach is 
to sufficiently restrict the actions of each active packet that no authentication is 
required. This is the approach taken in the PLAN system. However, since many 
advanced PLAN services utilize active extensions, this approach may simply rely 
on the existence of the first architectural solution, but exploit it for further gains. 
We see three promising research areas that have been exposed by our results. 
First, much of the cost of authentication is a "per-byte" cost, and thus reducing 
the size of the packet (e-g., by use of a "very-high-level language" or some other 
compression scheme) may allow a wider range of the active packetlactive exten- 
sion continuum to be exploited by programmers. Second, it would be extremely 
worthwhile to redo the experiments reported here in a second environment, such as 
ANTS. The major architectural points will almost surely remain true, but it would 
be valuable to understand some of the consequences of the language and security 
mechanisms on ANTS performance. Finally, these questions have to be continually 
reexamined as applications emerge. If most interesting applications can be written 
with security enforcement largely in the "control plane" then this model will dom- 
inate. If, however, many applications actually require operation in the transport 
plane, then new approaches following PLAN-like ideas will be needed. 
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APPENDIX 
A. CODE FOR THE ACTIVE PING 
open Safeloader 
open Printf 
open Wf 
open Saf eunix 
open Log 
open An-marshal 
type ping-packet = ( start  : string ; 
f i n i s h  : string; 
timestamp : f loat )  
l e t  ping-encode pkt = "start = I' pkt.start 
^ 'I; f i n i s h  = " A pkt . f inish 
A 'I; timestamp = 
perform, data switching. 
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(string-of-float pkt.timestamp) 
let decode-regexp = Str.regexp 
'I-start = \(.  *\) ; finish = \(.*\) It 
I#. , timestamp = \(.*\)$" 
let ping-decode str ofs = 
if not (Str.string-match decode-regexp 
str ofs) 
then f ailwith "bad packet1' 
else 
{ start = Str.matched-group I str; 
finish = Str.matched-group 2 str; 
timestamp = float-of-string 
(Str.matched-group 3 str) 
1 
(* 
* This is routine that starts things off by 
* handing the components of an ANEP header 
* to send-wf. 
* > 
let send-ping dest name = 
let code = 
Get-bytecode.get-bytecode name in 
let next-hop = Route.get-route dest in 
let hdr = 
{do-forward = true; type-id = 20) in 
let payload = ping-encode 
{ start = An.getAddress ( ) ;  
finish = dest ; 
timestamp = Time .get-time() 
1 in 
send-wf next-hop hdr [I "ping-out It 
code payload 
let ping-out arg-string = 
let {code=code; data=datastr; func=func) = 
decode arg-string 0 in 
let ping-packet = ping-decode datastr 0 in 
if (ping-packet.finish = An.getAddress0) 
then begin 
send-wf 
(Route.get-route ping-packet.start) 
{do-forward=true; type_id=20> [I 
"ping-in" code datastr; 
"at the remote machine" 
end else begin 
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send-wf 
(Route. get-route ping-packet .finish) 
{do-forward=true; type_id=20) [I 
"ping-out" code datastr; 
"not there yet; forward packet" 
end 
let ping-in arg-string = 
let {code=code; data=datastr; func=func) = 
decode arg-string 0 in 
let ping-packet = ping-decode datastr 0 in 
if (ping-packet.start = An.getAddress.0) 
then begin 
log-msg 
(Printf . sprintf "Success (%f sec) \nut 
((Time.get-time()) -. 
ping-packet .timestamp) ) ; 
"back at the sender" 
end else begin 
send-wf 
(Route.get-route ping-packet.start) 
{ do-forward=true; type_id=20 ) [I 
"ping-in" code datastr; 
"not back yet; forward packet" 
end 
let - = Func.register "ping-out" ping-out 
let - = Func.register "ping-in" ping-in 
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